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Abstract 
This research applies recursive Structural Vector Auto Regression (SVAR) model with short-
run restriction by testing two kinds of shocks: monetary and volatility. The first SVAR 
estimates the shock of contractionary monetary policy on Taiwan’s key monthly 
macroeconomic variables including exports, CPI, exchange rate, money supply, and Taiwan 
Weighted Stock Exchange (TWSE) Index. The second SVAR estimates the shock of 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) volatility of TWSE on 
Taiwan’s daily exchange rate, overnight interbank loan rate, and Taiwan Government Bond 
Index (TGBI). The first SVAR model shows that prize puzzle has been evident in Taiwan. The 
second SVAR model found flight to safety into bond market after the volatility shock in equity 
market.  Combining the results of both models and based on other literature reviews, we can 
also infer that effectiveness of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy exhibits non-
linearity in Taiwan. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The game plan of Taiwan’s Central Bank of Republic of China (CBC) has always been centered 
around preventing the New Taiwan Dollar (NTD) from breaking certain ceiling to keep up the 
competitiveness of high tech exports because since the early 1980s, Taiwan has become an 
export led economy and enjoyed a period of miraculous economic growth after the 
establishment of the Hsin-Chu Science Based Industrial Park which has led Taiwan becomes 
world’s leading exporter in high-tech products. Currently, Taiwan’s exchange regime is under 
managed floating exchange rate system. In the past twenty years, the range of USD/NTD has 
been hovered between 27.45 and 35.06. Then in 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers had 
posed an unprecedented challenge to CBC. The realized volatility of Taiwan Weighted Stock 
Exchange Index (TWSE) had jumped to as high as 60 compared to 20-year long-run average 
at 18. In just less than one year before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the discount rate of 
CBC was just peaked in December, 2007 at 3.375, the highest level in the last five years. To 
urgently respond to the Lehman repercussion on Taiwan’s financial markets and economy, 
CBC had aggressively cut discount rate for five times in just six months in 2008. Following 
the launch of Quantitative Easing (QE) as means of stimulating economy across the US, Europe, 
and Japan, the CBC has also lowered the discount rate by a total of 200 basis points as of July, 
2016.  
As a former trader of equity derivatives in Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong markets and government 
bond in Taiwan and the US markets, I am extremely passionate about the impact of monetary 
policy on financial markets, how central bank responds to financial market shocks, and how 
financial market volatility responds to different regime changes. Many literatures have done 
similar research and inspired me. For example, Nielsen and Shephard (2006) concluded that 
that jumps in financial markets are mostly caused by governmental announcements (p. 19). 
Bloom (2009) found that volatility shocks are strongly correlated with other measures of 
uncertainties like firm level earnings, output, and employment in his SVAR model (p. 623).  
 
In this paper, I will start with research on Taiwan’s monetary policy transmission mechanism 
that exhibits impact of shocks of contractionary monetary policy on key macroeconomic 
variables using monthly data. Then in the second model, I will analyse financial market 
uncertainty shock on daily overnight interbank loan rate, exchange rate, and bond market using 
daily frequency data. Both sections will be using Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model in 
which Romer (2012) defines it as a system of equations where each variable is regressed on a 
set of its own lagged values and lagged values of each of other variables (p. 225). Then I will 
make them become Structural-VAR (SVAR) to allow the prediction of intervention effect. 
 
Both SVAR models will implement recursive identification with short-run restriction that 
utilizes Cholesky decomposition for impulse response analysis. My scheme of the matrix form 
using lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition is based on the findings of Christiano, et al 
(2005), Erceg and Levin (2006), and Fujiwara and Takahashi (2012), but ordering and variables 
used are not exactly the same. In the first monthly frequency SVAR analysis on contractionary 
monetary policy. I run monthly data from July, 1996 to June, 2016 with a total observation of 
240. The estimated results exhibit prize puzzle which happens when contractionary monetary 
policy has failed to ease price level significantly in both CPI and equity market.  In the second 
SVAR analysis on financial market with the shock on TWSE volatility. I run daily data from 4 
January, 2005 to 29 July, 2016 with a total observation of 2865. Volatility shock usually 
happens whenever there is crash in equity market. Wu (2001) noted that volatility in equity 
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market is asymmetric in which returns and returns volatility are negative correlated (p. 856). 
Dendramis, et al (2015) mention that shift in volatility is often referred as structural breaks and 
may lead to financial crisis and large fluctuation in business cycle (p. 130). Back to my model, 
the estimated result shows that increase in TWSE volatility has induced downtrend in overnight 
interbank loan rate, depreciation of NTD, and increase in bond price. 
 
In the following, I will first build the SVAR models in section II and discuss the results and 
findings in section III. Finally, section IV summarizes the conclusion and lists possible 
extensions for future study. 
 
II. MODEL 
(A) Monthly frequency SVAR model on contractionary monetary policy shock 
To examine the shock of monetary policy on macro economy, I apply recursive identification 
with short run restriction on the monthly frequency SVAR model. The variables in the 
estimation order are log(exports), log(Consumer Price Index (CPI)), CBC discount rate, 
log(USD/NTD exchange rate), log(M2 money supply), log(TWSE). Export and CPI data are 
extracted from Taiwan’s National Statistics of Republic of China. Discount rate, USD/NTD, 
M2 money supply, and TWSE are obtained from statistical database of CBC. The USD/NTD 
provided is the nominal exchange rate using direct quote scheme. Most fundamentally, in this 
monthly SVAR model, I initially make sure that export, CPI, and M2 money supply have been 
seasonally adjusted by using X-13 method and ensure that entire system is stationary by using 
VAR stability condition check on EViews. The purposes of doing so are to prevent from high 
variance caused by seasonal patterns and spurious regression. Then I rely on Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (HQ) as my optimal lag selection criteria because HQ is more efficient 
when the number of observation is huge. Hannan and Quinn (1979) prove that HQ is able to 
underestimate the order of autoregression less than other model selection methods when 
observation is large (p. 7).  According to HQ of optimal lag selection test on EViews, It suggests 
using lag length 2.  
 
My ordering for this model is based on the assumptions that shock of increase in CBC discount 
rate instantaneously influence the export, followed by CPI, exchange rate, CBC discount rate, 
money supply, and TWSE index.  I use the methodology of Christiano, et al (2005) as partial 
reference which places central bank discount rate at the middle, output and inflation at the top, 
and stock price index at the bottom of column vector of shocks (p.4). I specifically pick export 
data to replace output in the monthly frequency SVAR model because export has always been 
the lifeline of Taiwan economy which represents 70 percent of GDP.  Moreover, using the 
export level as the first variable in the SVAR ensures the impact of export level is already 
controlled for when looking at the impact of discount rate shocks.  The six-variable VAR model 
is shown below:  
 
 
 
 
LEXPO = C1+ ∑ 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿1𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 −𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1
𝑖𝑖 +∑ 𝐿𝐿1𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝐹𝐹1𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + U 1t 
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LCPI = C2+ ∑ 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿2𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 −𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1
𝑖𝑖 +∑ 𝐿𝐿2𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝐹𝐹2𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + U 2t 
 
LNTD = C3+ ∑ 𝛼𝛼3𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿3𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 −𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1
𝑖𝑖 +∑ 𝐿𝐿3𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝐹𝐹3𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + U 3t 
 
TI = C4+ ∑ 𝛼𝛼4𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿4𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖4𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 −𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1
𝑖𝑖 +∑ 𝐿𝐿4𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝐹𝐹4𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + U 4t 
 
LMS = C5+ ∑ 𝛼𝛼5𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿5𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖5 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 −𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1
𝑖𝑖 +∑ 𝐿𝐿5𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝐹𝐹5𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + U 5t 
 
LTWSE = C6+ ∑ 𝛼𝛼6𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽6𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿6𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖6 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 −𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1
𝑖𝑖 +∑ 𝐿𝐿6𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝐹𝐹6𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 + U 6t 
 
Where: LEXPO denotes log(export), LCPI denotes log(CPI), LNTD denotes log(USD/NTD),TI denotes CBC 
discount rate, LMS denotes log(M2 money supply), LTWSE denotes log(TWSE), and U represents white-noise 
disturbance. 
 
My explanation for identification of this monthly SVAR model is in the following. Export is 
not affected by any other variables in the short-run. CPI is contemporaneously affected by 
export. CBC discount rate is contemporaneously affected by export and CPI. USD/NTD is 
contemporaneously affected by export, CPI, CBC discount rate. M2 money supply is 
contemporaneously affected by all of the above except TWSE. Lastly, TWSE is affected by all 
other variables. The matrix form using lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition which 
exhibits relationship between the reduced form errors and the structural disturbances is shown 
below:   
 
  Uexpo  1 0 0 0 0         0             εexpo 
  Ucpi  t21 1 0 0 0         0            εcpi   
  Untd      =  t31 t32 1 0 0         0            εntd    
  Uti  t41 t42 t43 1 0         0            εti     
  Ums  t51 t52 t53             t54        1         0            εms 
  Utwse  t61 t62 t63             t64        t65       1            εtwse         
Where: we can express shock, Uexpo as a function of structural shock εexpo, and so on. 
 
(B) Daily frequency SVAR model on volatility shock 
To examine the shock of TWSE volatility on financial market, I apply recursive identification 
with short run restriction on the daily frequency VAR model. The variables in the estimation 
order are log(USD/NTD exchange rate), TWSE volatility, overnight interbank loan rate, and 
log(price of Taiwan Government Bond Index (TGBI)) which is an equally weighted index 
comprised of 2-Year, 5-Year, 10-Year, and 20-Year treasury bonds and is used as the 
benchmark for Taiwan bond market in this research. I firstly obtain daily TWSE closing price 
from CBC and then apply GARCH (1.1) model by excel spreadsheet to estimate daily volatility. 
All parameters of GARCH in exhibit IX of appendix section are estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation on the log likelihood function. GARCH is a type of stochastic volatility 
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models that take random shocks into account. Bollerslev (1986) introduced Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model that explains leptokurtic 
behaviour of financial markets, assumes returns are uncorrelated because the conditional mean 
does not depend on previous returns, and assumes conditional variance are a weighted 
combination of all previous squared excess returns. (p. 311). Then TBGI data is obtained from 
the database of Taipei Exchange. Overnight interbank loan rate and NTD are obtained from the 
CBC database. Moreover, in this daily SVAR model, I once again ensure that entire system is 
stationary by using VAR stability condition check on EViews to eliminate the risk of spurious 
regression. Lastly, I also rely on HQ for optimal lag selection and it suggests using lag length 
8.  
 
Fujiwara and Takahashi (2012) analysed global financial market interdependence with VAR 
and their ordering is based on market closing time (p. 138). In this research, my ordering is 
based on the market opening hour and liquidity. Foreign exchange market operates 24 hours 
per trading day. Thus, the last closing price in US trading hour will have strong impact on the 
opening of Taiwan equity and bond markets as well as banking system at 9 AM local time. 
Thus, USD/NTD exchange rate is the first variable based on not only market timing but also 
being the largest market in terms of trading volume.  The second variable should be the 
volatility of TWSE because equity market has the second best liquidity, while overnight 
interbank loan rate and bond markets are not only mostly traded by institutional investors but 
also have much lower liquidity than that in Taiwan’s equity market. The four-variable VAR 
model is shown below: 
 
LNTD  = C1+ ∑ 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖1𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 +𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1  U 1t 
 
TSVOL = C2+∑ 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 +𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1  U 2t 
 
TONI  =  C3+∑ 𝛼𝛼3𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 +𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1  U 3t 
 
LTB  = C3+ ∑ 𝛼𝛼4𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑖𝑖4𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑖𝑖 +𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1  U 4t 
 
Where: LNTD denotes log(USD/NTD), TSVOL denotes TWSE volatility, TONI denotes overnight interbank loan 
rate, LTB denotes log(TGBI), and U represents white-noise disturbance. 
 
My explanation for identification of this daily SVAR model is in the following. USD/NTD is 
not affected by any other variables. TWSE volatility is contemporaneously affected by 
exchange rate. Overnight interbank interest rate is then affected by exchange rate and equity 
market. Finally, the least liquid Taiwan government bond market will be affected by all other 
variables. The matrix form using lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition which exhibits 
relationship between the reduced form errors and the structural disturbances is shown below:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Untd              1 0 0 0            εntd 
  Utsvol t21 1 0 0          εtsvol 
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  Utoni      =  t31 t32 1 0          εtoni 
  Utb  t41 t42 t43 1          εtb 
Where: we can express the shock Untd as a function of structural shock, εntd, and so on. 
 
III. RESULTS 
(A) Result of monthly frequency SVAR on contractionary monetary policy 
Exhibit III in appendix section shows the impulse response functions of one standard deviation 
of positive CBC discount rate (TI) shock on LEXPO, LCPI, LNTD, LMS, and LTWSE. 
Following an unexpected, temporary, and exogenous increase in the CBC discount rate for the 
estimated period, Taiwan’s export does not go down significantly until after 12 months. The 
positive growth in export firstly is peaked by the second month and then down 0.6 percent for 
the unexpected one percent increase in CBC discount rate. Moreover, despites CBC’s effort to 
cease inflation, price puzzle somewhat happens in Taiwan. Friedman (1968) had argued that 
monetary action takes a longer time to affect the price level than to affect the monetary totals 
(p. 15). In Taiwan’s case, CPI continues to grow right after positive interest rate shock and will 
not touch apex until after ten months. Sims (1992) defines price puzzle as positive response of 
the price level to a contractionary monetary policy and also found that in many countries, 
response of price to monetary shock is positive initially but will get weaker and eventually 
turns to negative. (p. 988). In the foreign exchange market, NTD instantaneously appreciate by 
only 0.002 percent for the positive one percent shock to CBC discount rate. Then NTD reversed 
to depreciation versus the baseline after 22 months. This phenomenon could be explained by 
Taiwan Central Bank’s preference to set a cap on NTD appreciation but no floor on NTD 
depreciation because Taiwan is an export-led economy. Chen and Wu (2008) also found that 
NTD is undervalued compared to its discount rate level (p. 181).  Furthermore, Chen (2013) 
notes that under sterilization of central bank, interest rate policy can only explains indirect 
intervention of central bank behaviour, but cannot capture direct intervention of central bank 
behaviour (p. 5). Chen, et al (2009) also argue that effect of Taiwan’s monetary policy on its 
output is usually insignificant due to CBC’s foreign exchange interventions (p. 16). Shen and 
Chen (2004) point out that Taiwan central bank will enforce the so called “slowdown policy” 
when NTD is appreciating and “let-it-go policy” when NTD is depreciating (p. 200). The 
response of CBC discount rate to the shock itself will immediately elevated by about 0.08 
percent in the first month and then peaked by the sixth month. It will eventually reach steady 
state after about five years. Although money supply will also drop immediately after the shock 
to CBC discount rate, the retreat was not significant and will only lasted for seven months. 
After one year, money supply will make positive reversal and remain slightly above baseline. 
At last, similar to the trend of exports, TWSE index will continue to go up and reach the climax 
by the seventh month but only will go up by 0.02 percent after the one percent increase in CBC 
discount rate. Overall, the deviations had been very small in export, CPI, NTD, discount rate, 
money supply, and equity market. We can also infer that Taiwan’s contractionary monetary 
policy is less effective in the short-run than in the long-run especially when it comes to cooling 
down equity market and CPI. 
The above results show that when Taiwan CBC is implementing contractionary monetary 
policy, it will carefully ensure that volatility of structural change in all economic activities will 
be insignificant. According to variance decomposition, which helps uncovering 
interrelationships among the variables, only minor percentage of fluctuations in export, CPI, 
NTD, M2 money supply, and TWSE have been attributed to positive interest rate shock. 
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Among the highlights, the highest is TWSE which has slightly more than six percent of 
fluctuation attributed to the positive interest rate shock by the 11th month. The second highest 
is CPI which will have about 6.2 percent of fluctuation owing to positive interest rate shock by 
the 22nd month.  The least is export which will reach more than 3 percent of fluctuation due to 
contractionary monetary shock by the 26th month. Similar results have been found in the US 
too. Boivin and Giannoni (2001) stress that since 1980s, although response of output and 
inflation to unexpected shock of Fed fund rate were small, that does not mean monetary policy 
is less effective, rather, it has been enforced in a stabilizing approach by smoothing the 
volatility in interest rate (p. 32). Moreover, investors may interpret interest rate hike as signal 
of strong economic growth during bullish stock market and interest rate cut as signal of bearish 
market.  They are likely to pour more money into stock market even after interest rate hike. 
Keynesian theory has tried to explain this phenomenon. Caporale and Soliman (2010) found 
that decrease in short-term interest rate will, in fact, negatively affect asset prices and demand 
for money based on their findings in the US, UK, and Germany (p. 13).   
Back to Taiwan, if examine causality using Granger causality test which can assist determining 
whether past and current values can forecast future values, TWSE will Granger cause CBC 
discount rate as exhibit II shows that we can reject the null hypothesis that TWSE does not 
Granger cause CBC discount rate at 95 percent confidence interval. However, the other way 
around shows that CBC discount rate does not Granger cause TWSE. Altogether, CBC discount 
rate can also Granger cause export, CPI, and NTD but failed to Granger cause M2 money 
supply at 95 percent confidence interval. At last, I check the robustness of SVAR model using 
unrestricted VAR. Both results resemble each other.  
 
(B) Result of daily frequency SVAR on volatility shock 
Exhibit VII in appendix section shows the impulse response functions of one standard deviation 
of positive volatility (TSVOL) shock on LNTD, TONI, and LTB. Following an unexpected, 
temporary, and exogenous increase in the daily GARCH volatility of TWSE index for the 
estimated period, NTD will appreciate but by very small margin in the first two weeks and then 
reverse to depreciation. Volatility will rise 2.49 percent on the first day in response to one 
percent increase in volatility shock. After reaching the summit on the first day, volatility keeps 
diminishing and become insignificant exactly by the 90th day. Usually, the CBC will step in to 
calm down the fear on TWSE by intervening the exchange rate market and by decreasing 
discount rate which also has direct impact on the overnight interbank loan rate. Therefore, we 
can see that deviation of overnight interbank loan rate will only stay positive for the first three 
days. Central bank policy has direct effect on overnight interbank loan rate as well. Allen, et al 
(2009) note that most central banks use open market operation to target the interest rate on 
overnight interbank market. They can buy or sell securities to affect the amount of liquidity 
held by banks (p. 644). By the 80th day after volatility shock, overnight interbank loan rate will 
decreased by 0.01 percent. Furthermore, whenever there is shock to equity market volatility, 
there will be a situation so called the “flight to safety” in which investors will shift asset 
allocation from equity to bond. Baele, et al (2014) explain flight to safety as a situation when 
bond returns are positive, equity returns are negative after jump in equity volatility (p. 31). 
Therefore, as Taiwan’s equity market turmoil begins, TGBI will start increasing after first week 
of fluctuation. Although from the impulse response table, TGBI looks like only jump 0.0006 
percent by the 100th day which is around the peak, this magnitude is actually quite large for 
bond index and the persistence of bond’s bull market trend had been strong after the equity 
volatility shock.  Overall, in variance decomposition which indicates how the variances of 
endogenous variables are explained by volatility shock in this model, after 50 days, eight 
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percent each for interbank rate and TGBI fluctuation can be attributed to jump in equity 
volatility. Only less than five percent of NTD fluctuation is due to equity volatility shock. If 
looking at Granger causality in exhibit VI of appendix, GARCH volatility of TWSE index and 
TGBI can Granger cause to each other since we reject the null hypothesis at 95 percent 
confidence interval. At last, I check the robustness of SVAR model using unrestricted VAR. 
Both results resemble each other. 
 
IV. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
In the first SVAR model on CBC discount rate shock, Taiwan’s contractionary monetary policy 
maybe seemly ineffective in stabilizing price inflation especially during the first ten months 
but it also shows that when CBC is implementing such contraction policy it will ensure that 
overall economic activity will not be negatively affected with huge fluctuation. By achieving 
such goal, CBC will immediately activate sterilization to ensure that increase in interest rate 
does not jeopardize export which is the most important lifeline of Taiwan economy. In the 
second SVAR model where I use shock on equity’s GARCH volatility, CBC’s immediate 
response with expansionary monetary policy, which is directly linked to daily overnight 
interbank rate, has been highly effective in calming down the fear factor on the equity market 
and driving up the government bond prices that reflects demand for flight to safety. 
 
For future extension, I plan to use Implied Volatility Index (VIX) in lieu of GARCH volatility 
because implied volatility is the market volatility derived from Black-Scholes options pricing 
model. Taiwan has its own VIX index and has one of the most active equity index options 
markets in the world. VIX is usually more sensitive to news impact and trade in premium 
compared to historical volatility. However, next time, I prefer to switch to Japan market in 
which Nikkei 225, JPY, and Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) index are the most volatile 
among Asian equity, foreign exchange, and fixed income markets. On the contrary, Taiwan’s 
financial markets are much less exciting because of extremely low impulse response to policy 
announcement shock. In addition, I always wanted to go further by using non-recursive 
identification scheme but EViews often failed to handle the computation of non-recursive 
model for higher frequency data; therefore, next time I better convert all data to quarterly 
frequency. As for further studies in monetary policy transmission mechanism, Walsh (2010) 
points out that VAR fails to incorporate forward-looking variables (p.24) and mainstream 
central bankers have shifted to the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model 
which combines rational expectations with a microeconomic foundation. (p. 28).  Therefore, 
in the future, I prefer to use DSGE model to examine various uncertainty shocks on 
macroeconomic variables and financial markets.  
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Exhibit I. Stationary test for monthly frequency VAR model with TI shock 
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 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
Exhibit II. Granger Causality for monthly frequency VAR model with TI shock 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 10/01/16   Time: 10:14 
Sample: 1996M07 2016M06 
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     LCPI does not Granger Cause LEXPO  238  3.54127 0.0305 
 LEXPO does not Granger Cause LCPI  24.2790 3.E-10 
    
     LNTD does not Granger Cause LEXPO  238  3.17047 0.0438 
 LEXPO does not Granger Cause LNTD  1.13362 0.3236 
    
     TI does not Granger Cause LEXPO  238  8.14116 0.0004 
 LEXPO does not Granger Cause TI  0.13582 0.8731 
    
     LMS does not Granger Cause LEXPO  238  9.13022 0.0002 
 LEXPO does not Granger Cause LMS  10.9128 3.E-05 
    
     LTWSE does not Granger Cause LEXPO  238  2.89069 0.0575 
 LEXPO does not Granger Cause LTWSE  0.29580 0.7442 
    
     LNTD does not Granger Cause LCPI  238  0.15290 0.8583 
 LCPI does not Granger Cause LNTD  1.05519 0.3498 
    
     TI does not Granger Cause LCPI  238  5.09593 0.0068 
 LCPI does not Granger Cause TI  0.90994 0.4040 
    
     LMS does not Granger Cause LCPI  238  8.96215 0.0002 
 LCPI does not Granger Cause LMS  2.20193 0.1129 
    
    
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
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 LTWSE does not Granger Cause LCPI  238  3.86076 0.0224 
 LCPI does not Granger Cause LTWSE  1.17679 0.3101 
    
     TI does not Granger Cause LNTD  238  4.18300 0.0164 
 LNTD does not Granger Cause TI  3.08676 0.0475 
    
     LMS does not Granger Cause LNTD  238  2.05113 0.1309 
 LNTD does not Granger Cause LMS  0.67166 0.5118 
    
     LTWSE does not Granger Cause LNTD  238  3.12755 0.0457 
 LNTD does not Granger Cause LTWSE  1.60811 0.2025 
    
     LMS does not Granger Cause TI  238  0.34059 0.7117 
 TI does not Granger Cause LMS  1.61281 0.2015 
    
     LTWSE does not Granger Cause TI  238  14.3109 1.E-06 
 TI does not Granger Cause LTWSE  1.24423 0.2901 
    
     LTWSE does not Granger Cause LMS  238  2.06753 0.1288 
 LMS does not Granger Cause LTWSE  1.40187 0.2482 
    
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit III. Impulse response to TI, July 1996 to June 2016 
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Where: LEXPO denotes log(export), LCPI denotes log(CPI), LNTD denotes log(USD/NTD),TI denotes CBC 
discount rate, LMS denotes log(M2 money supply), and LTWSE denotes log(TWSE). 
 
 
 
Exhibit IV. Variance decomposition, July 1996 to June 2016 
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Exhibit V. Stationary test for daily frequency VAR model with TSVOL shock 
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 No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
 
Exhibit VI. Granger Causality for daily frequency VAR model with TSVOL shock 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 10/01/16   Time: 10:54 
Sample: 1 2845  
Lags: 8   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     TSVOL does not Granger Cause LNTD  2837  1.78379 0.0755 
 LNTD does not Granger Cause TSVOL  0.84355 0.5641 
    
     TONI does not Granger Cause LNTD  2828  1.17547 0.3098 
 LNTD does not Granger Cause TONI  0.14433 0.9971 
    
     LTB does not Granger Cause LNTD  2837  1.27084 0.2540 
 LNTD does not Granger Cause LTB  1.47638 0.1604 
    
     TONI does not Granger Cause TSVOL  2828  1.27261 0.2531 
 TSVOL does not Granger Cause TONI  0.93516 0.4859 
    
     LTB does not Granger Cause TSVOL  2837  3.25971 0.0011 
 TSVOL does not Granger Cause LTB  2.44834 0.0122 
    
     LTB does not Granger Cause TONI  2828  2.68581 0.0061 
 TONI does not Granger Cause LTB  4.98904 4.E-06 
    
     
Exhibit VII. Impulse response to TSVOL, 4th January, 2005 to 29th July, 2016 
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Where: LNTD denotes log(USD/NTD), TSVOL denotes TWSE volatility, TONI denotes overnight interbank loan 
rate, and LTB denotes log(TGBI). 
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Exhibit VIII. Variance decomposition, 4th January, 2005 to 29th July, 2016 
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Exhibit IX. GARCH 1.1 estimation  
 
Where: alpha determines reaction of volatility, beta determines the persistence of volatility, alpha + beta 
determines the rate of convergence of the conditional volatility to long-term volatility, and omega determines 
the unconditional volatility. 
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